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I.

To Lease or not to Lease : A_Comparison of "Traditional"
Indian Mineral Leases with other Structures for Minpr^l
Development.
~
"
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A.

The Statutes.

Federal law requires consent of

Congress to any conveyance of Indian lands.

Two basic

modern statutes govern mineral development of Indian tribal
lands: —

1.

The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,

codified as amended as 25 U.S.C. §§'396a-396g.

In general,

the 1938 Act permits leases of tribal lands for not to exceed
a ten-year primary term and as long thereafter as minerals are
produced in paying quantities.

The Act requires competitive

sales of oil and gas leases by public auction or sealed bids
after appropriate notice.

The Secretary^can reject all bids

and readvertise oil and gas leases.

(Alsop with consent of the

tribe, an oil and gas lease may be negotiated without
competitive bidding —

but only with the Secretary’s approval.

Performance bonds must be furnished to assure compliance with

— A tribe developing its own minerals entirely by itself
would not require any federal approval. However, if a tribe
enters into a lease, or any kind of service or employment
contract with an outside company or any non-Indian, that lease
or contract would require federal approval. See 25 U.S.C. §
81.
— These two statutes relate to tribal development of^ _
minerals. Leasing of individual Indian allotments for mining
purposes is chiefly governed by 25 U.S.C. § 396.

lease terms.

Leasing under the 1938 Act is also governed by

fairly extensive Secretarial regulations.

2.

Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982,

codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108.

The 1982 Act authorizes

leases or any other agreement such as a joint venture,
operating, production sharing, service, or managerial
agreement.

Unlike, the 1938 Act, the 1982 statute does not

require competitive bidding for oil and gas leases.

An

individual Indian holding a beneficial interest in mineral
resources can include these in a tribal mineral agreement if
the Secretary approves.

In deciding whether to approve a

minerals agreement under the 1982 Act, the Secretary shall
consider the potential economic return to the tribe, the
potential environmental, social and cultural effects of the
agreement on the tribe and provisions for resolving disputes
that may arise between the parties to the agreement.

B.

Tax and Other Incentives to Develop Minerals on
Indian Lands.
1.

Under the 1982 A c t .

A tribe is ordinarily not

subject to any form of state taxation or state regulation,
except in the very unusual circumstance where Congress has
specifically authorized it.

This should be the result

wherever a tribe develops its own minerals.
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under the 1982 Act by entering into sn employment contract or
service agreement with a non—Indian mineral company to sssist
it, state severance, personal property, gross receipts and
like taxes should not apply.

Under such an agreement, the non-Indian
contract miner could lease equipment to the tribe or the tribe
could purchase the equipment paying for it over time.
Alternatively, by agreement the contract miner could
contribute equipment to the joint venture with the tribe.

A

contract miner could also agree to provide other services.

There is strong authority for the proposition
that the non-Indian contract miner would also not be subject
to state taxation or state regulation on its share of the
proceeds.

E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462

U.S. 324 (1983); Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).

However, these cases require

that the courts undertake a "particularized inquiry" into any
state interest supporting a regulation or particular tax, as
against the federal and tribal interest in a tax or regulatory
immunity.

Thus, the exact outcome may turn on the fact

situation of a particular case, and cannot be predicted with
certainty.
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2.

Under the 1938 Act.

the result should be the same.

In a lease transaction,

The Supreme Court in 1988

summarily affirmed the Ninth Circuit holding (819 F.2d 895)
that the State of Montana could not impose its 30% coal
severance tax on a mineral lessee of Crow coal.
Crow Tribe, __ U.S. __, 98 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1988).

Montana v.
It may be,

however, that the size of this particular tax militated
heavily in favor of tribal immunity.

It remains to be seen

whether immunity will be the rule in all cases challenging
state taxes on non-Indian mineral lessees.

The Supreme Court

has recently granted review Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. State of
New Mexico, __ 745 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1987) .

In Cotton, the New

Mexico Court of Appeals held that the state taxes could be
imposed.

3.

Tribal taxes.

the production of minerals.

In Cotton, the Tribe also taxed
This right has been confirmed.

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).

If both the State and the Tribe can legally tax
mineral extraction, and both do so, there is an obvious
disincentive to develop Indian minerals.

For example, Cotton

Petroleum paid taxes (state and tribal) amounting to about 14
percent of the value of its production.

On non-Indian land,

its state taxes would be about 8 percent of production.
Moreover, the existence even of moderate state taxes as a
practical matter limits the tax revenues a tribe can expect to
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receive and therefore the governmental services it can provide
on the Reservation and for its people.

(To illustrate, if New

Mexico's 8 percent tax cannot legally be applied to Cotton,
the tribe involved could raise its 6 percent tax to 8 percent
and still be competitive with non-Indian lands.)

Because of

this result, I believe any state taxation of mineral
extraction which a tribe also taxes impermissibly interferes
with the authority of a tribe to govern itself.

It remains to

be seen whether the Court will agree.

The structure of the mineral development
venture may have tribal tax implications as well.

The tribe

of course will not be taxing its own enterprise, so if -a
tribal enterprise develops coal or oil and gas under the 1982
Act, it would not be taxed.

A lessee is, however, subject to

tribal severance and other taxes.
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache

(Some tribes have agreed to

tax-caps in mineral leases, but any kind of limitation on
tribal taxation raises serious issues as to tribal sovereignty
which are avoided if a tribal enterprise does the development
with assistance of a contract miner under the 1982 Act.)

4.

Regulatory implications.

It is likely that

state regulatory law also does not apply to tribal development
of tribal minerals.

Federal regulations

(a) of general

application, or (b) that specifically pertain to Indian
minerals would generally be applicable.
5

This immunity from

state law may create particular incentives for Indian mineral
development.

C.

Tribal control.

Some argue that joint ventures or

service agreements that give tribes "a piece of the action"
provide greater tribal control of the transaction.

In theory,

at least, there should not be greater tribal control under a
1982 Act agreement than under a 1938 Act lease.

In-either

circumstance, the duties, powers and responsibilities of the
parties are spelled out by the agreement -- be it a lease, a
service agreement, a joint venture or a partnership.
governing document controls.

The

Its terms are flexible.

The

Secretary, moreover, must approve both transactions, so both
are subject to federal regulation.

D.

Economic and financial implications.

Tribes should

think carefully about the economic implications of an oil and
gas agreement under the 1982 Act.
1938 Act does provide protections.

Competitive bidding in the
Even the best of experts

may be wrong in a speculative field like oil and gas
development.

If the tribe develops its own oil and gas

pursuant to a service contract, and hits a dry hole, the tribe
takes nothing.

By contrast, competitive bids under the 1938

Act provide a front-end bonus, which can be substantial.

With

hardrock minerals, where the consequences of a mineral
development are more predictable, a 1982 Act agreement is more
attractive from the tribal standpoint.
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A joint venture, moreover, may require some tribal
financial contribution —

in contrast to a more traditional

lease where all the capital must be advanced and all the risk
of loss borne by the non-Indian company.

Of course, the

extent of the Tribe's financial obligations are governed by
the mineral agreement itself.

II.

Other Issues .

A.

Dispute resolution.

However a mineral transaction

is structured -- as a lease or otherwise -- thought needs to
be given to dispute resolution.

Tribes will surely resist

state courts, and non-Indian companies may resist tribal
courts -- although tribal courts are increasingly being
recognized as forums for settlement of civil disputes.

Thought could be given to structuring a binding
arbitration process.

This was done in the Fort Peck Water

Compact which will be discussed separately at the Conference.
The Compact provides for binding arbitration by establishing a
three-member board, one selected by the Tribe, the other by
the State (in a mineral agreement, by the mineral company) and
a third neutral selected by the two.

The board can be

empowered to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and documents
from the tribe and company, take evidence and reach written
decisions on virtually every issue that could be subject to
dispute.

The parties can set time frames in which decisions
7

must be reached in the agreement.

The agreement can limit

judicial review to simply enforcing the arbitrator's decision
unless it was produced by fraud, corrpution or the like.

B.

Employment issues.

Indian preference or a set quota

of jobs is likely to be of great importance to tribes.

Union

and other objectives are often important to companies.

Any

agreement must consider employment questions if the
development is expected to be a significant source of jobs.
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